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Abstract
Radio Block Center (RBC) is a core part of the Chinese Train Control System level 3 (CTCS-3) which is
a protocol for safety critical systems. The correctness of the RBC handover protocol is one of the most
important factors aﬀecting the safety of systems. Hence, it is of great importance to ensure the correctness
of the protocol. To this end, some formal methods have been used to model and verify the protocol. In
this paper, we use Modeling, Simulation and Veriﬁcation Language (MSVL) as the formal language to
model and verify the protocol. The result shows that the behavior of RBC handover is consistent with the
speciﬁcation.
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1 Introduction
CTCS-3 is a protocol for control train systems in Chinese railway area which is in
developing and required to be safety critical. The system requirement speciﬁcation
of CTCS-3 is written in natural language, inevitably containing ambiguities and
defects. Ambiguities and defects in requirements speciﬁcations may lead to failure
in the whole system development. The failure could be fatal in case of safety critical
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systems. Therefore, high-quality speciﬁcations are required, which should satisfy the
quality properties, such as correctness, completeness, consistency, and traceability
[16].
In order to describe the requirement more formally, the Uniﬁed Modeling Lan-
guage (UML) is often used to model the system requirement speciﬁcation. As a
visual modeling language, UML has some advantages in system modeling and has
become a popular modeling language since its inception. To make use of the char-
acteristics of UML, numerous tools (Rational Rose, Argo UML, Rhapsody etc.)
that exist in the market have to be used to support its functions. However, unfor-
tunately, none of them guarantees speciﬁcation correctness [1]. Therefore, formal
veriﬁcation methods have been adopted to verify whether or not a system satis-
ﬁes the desired properties. In fact, many other studies have been done in formal
analysis of RBC handover with diﬀerent approaches. In [12], the authors model
and verify the RBC handover of European Train Control System level 2 (ETCS-2)
with Diﬀerential Dynamic Logic. According to the RBC handover protocol, the au-
thors recapitulate the behavior of RBC handover brieﬂy and build a formal model
which successfully describes the behavior of the RBC handover. Furthermore, the
collision avoidance and derailment avoidance requirements they propose are both
fulﬁlled through the ﬁnal veriﬁcation. In [2], RBC of ETCS-2 is formally modeled
and validated based on message sequence charts. Using Stochastic Petri Nets, [15]
establishes the failure probability models of the handover conduct for ETCS-2 with
two diﬀerent train conﬁgurations, and oﬀers the analysis of the inﬂuence of diﬀerent
train velocities and RBC overlap on the successful probability of RBC handover. In
[11], Faber et al. use the formal language CSP-OZ-DC to describe the speciﬁcation
of RBC of ETCS-2, and give a model checking and reasoning veriﬁcation method
after translating the model into PEA.
Projection Temporal Logic (PTL) [3,4,10] is a useful formalism for system ver-
iﬁcation. MSVL [7,8,5] is an executable subset of PTL and can be used to model,
simulate and verify concurrent systems. To do so, a system is modeled as an MSVL
program and a property of the system is speciﬁed by a Propositional Projection
Temporal Logic (PPTL) formula. Thus, whether or not the system satisﬁes the
property can be checked by means of model checking with the same logic frame-
work [6,9,17]. In addition, asynchronous communication techniques have been im-
plemented in MSVL, hence, MSVL can be employed to model an asynchronous
distributed system [14]. In this paper, we use MSVL as the formal language to
model the RBC handover protocol and verify some properties of the protocol.
The remainder of this paper is constructed as follows. In section 2, the MSV
toolkit for MSVL is brieﬂy introduced. The RBC handover protocol is described in
section 3. Section 4 and 5 dedicate to modeling, simulation and veriﬁcation of the
protocol. Finally, we give conclusion in section 6.
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2 MSV Toolkit
The language MSVL is a subset of Projection Temporal Logic with framing tech-
nique [8]. A toolkit named MSV has been developed and the structure of the toolkit
is shown in ﬁgure 1. As its name shows, the MSV toolkit can work in three modes:
modeling, simulation and veriﬁcation. With the simulation mode, the values of
variables in the program at each state are evaluated and outputted while with the
modeling mode, the model of the program is given. A user can input a property
described by a PPTL formula with the veriﬁcation mode and the MSV toolkit will
check whether the system satisﬁes the property or not automatically. If the prop-
erty is not satisﬁed, all counter-examples will be given by the MSV toolkit and the
system designer can modify the system according to the counter-examples. The
veriﬁcation process is shown in ﬁgure 2. In addition, the formal deﬁnitions of pro-
cess structures, channel structures and communication commands are presented in
[14], which enable us to model and verify concurrent systems with asynchronous
communication.
	

	
	





 

!	
!

"	#	 $%
	






	
	
 	
 	
	
 
Fig. 1. The Structure of MSV Toolkit
3 RBC Handover Protocol for CTCS-3
3.1 The structure of CTCS-3
Before introducing the RBC handover protocol, we ﬁrst make a brief introduction
of the structure of CTCS-3. CTCS-3 mainly consists of three subsystems, as shown
in ﬁgure 3, the on-board subsystem, the ground subsystem and the network com-
munication subsystem.
As a core ground subsystem of CTCS-3, the main task of RBC is to guarantee
the safety and eﬃciency of trains and it is a control system designed based on the
K. Yang et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 309 (2014) 51–62 53
6\VWHP 3URSHUW\
069/3URJUDP 337/)RUPXOD
/1)*RI
6DWLVILHG
˄1R&RXQWHUH[DPSOH˅
1RW6DWLVILHG
&RXQWHUH[DPSOH
069,QWHUSUHWHU
& '& '
 
Fig. 2. Veriﬁcation Process of MSV Toolkit
principle of fail-safe in railway signaling systems. RBC uses the information from
other subsystems to compute real-time Movement Authority (MA) and forwards
the MA to the train controlled by it.
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Fig. 3. The Structure of CTCS-3
The RBC subsystem includes communication modules (wireless information pro-
cess module and ground information process module), control modules (train control
order and train movement interval management) and the MA computing module
[13].
3.2 RBC Handover Protocol
Due to the limitation of the control capacity of one RBC, multiple RBCs are placed
along a railway. When a train arrives at the border of the control area of the
current RBC, the control of the train should be handed over to the next RBC
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and this procedure is called RBC handover, as shown in ﬁgure 4. Under normal
circumstances, the procedure is completed automatically and driver’s intervention
is not needed. Two cases are included in the conduct of RBC handover: 1. RBC
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Fig. 4. RBC Handover
hands over with two normal radio stations; 2. RBC hands over with only one normal
radio station. The handing over procedures in both cases are diﬀerent. We focus
on the second case here. We use RBC1 to represent the handover RBC and RBC2
the takeover RBC.
The procedure of RBC handover with one normal radio station is as follows:
1) After a train passes the level transition announcement balise group (LTA) for
RBC transition, the train will send a position report to RBC1;
2) When RBC1 receives the position report from the train, it will send the RBC
transition command (message packet 131) to the train and the route requesting
information to RBC2;
3) If there is a route available in the region of RBC2, RBC2 will send Hybrid
Movement Authority to RBC1, or it will send message “NoMA” to RBC1;
4) According to the information from RBC2, RBC1 sends extended message
“Hybrid MA” or “NoMA” to the train;
5) The train sends a position report to RBC1 after the front end of the train
(maximum safe front end) passed the transition border;
6) RBC1 forwards the position report to RBC2;
7) RBC2 sends takeover information to RBC1 after receiving the position report
from RBC1;
8) The train sends a position report to RBC1 after the rear end of the train
passed the transition border;
9) Based on the position report provided by the train, when RBC1 detects that
the rear end of the train (minimum safe rear end) has passed the RBC1/RBC2
transition border, the train will be commanded to close the communication session
with RBC1;
10) After the train received the disconnection order from RBC1, it will discon-
nect the communication with RBC1. The train starts to call RBC2 based on the
previous command from RBC1. If the call is successful, the train sends initializa-
tion information (M155) to RBC2, RBC2 sends communication version information
(M32) to the train, and the train sends communication establishing information
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(M159) to RBC2. Then, the communication is established; and
11) RBC2 generates MA and sends the MA to the train. Thus, the transition
from RBC1 to RBC2 is completed.
The narrative text description above is very redundant and not intuitive, but
detailed. It dedicates on supporting and interpreting the graphic and tabular form
in the system requirement speciﬁcation.
We model the “RBC handover” process using UML sequence diagram. UML
sequence diagrams are behavioral diagrams which is a simple, expressive, intuitive,
graphical and standardized notation used to specify interactions among system enti-
ties in many diﬀerent situations. Along with class diagrams and use case diagrams,
the sequence diagram is the most popular diagram of the UML. The expressiveness
of the sequence diagram ensures the consistency between the model and speciﬁcation
of a system [16].
The UML sequence diagram modeling approach maps the interacting entities
and the event occurrences of the scenarios to the participants (called objects in
UML1.x) and the messages of the sequence diagrams. The modeling steps are listed
as follows:
(1) List all the entities (including system components) interacting in the scenario;
(2) Find out all the event occurrences and the associations among the entities
of the scenario;
(3) Map the basic elements (including the entities, event occurrences and the
associations) of the scenario to the sequence diagram; and
(4) Check the consistency between the scenario and the sequence diagram.
Following the listed steps, we construct the sequence diagram model of the “RBC
handover” scenario as shown in ﬁgure 5. The meanings of messages in ﬁgure 5 are
indicated in table 1.
4 Simulation and Modeling
A UML sequence diagram of the procedure of RBC handover is given in the pre-
vious section. In this section, we translate the sequence diagram into an MSVL
program. There are three main components in the procedure of RBC handover:
TRAIN, RBC1 and RBC2. They are independently distributed components run-
ning in parallel. Corresponding to each component, we deﬁne a process. The three
processes are parallel and there is a communication channel between each two of
them. The state of a train will change according to the messages it receives. The
result of simulation under the normal circumstance (there is no message loss) is
shown in ﬁgure 6. The meaning of the variables in the program is shown in table
2. The value of the variable “FinishHandover” is equal to 1 at the last state, which
means that the procedure of RBC handover is completed successfully.
We run the program with MSVL toolkit under modeling model and all execution
paths are shown in ﬁgure 7. Due to the fact that the paths are too long to completely
show in the ﬁgure, only part of the paths is shown. The two paths in ﬁgure 7
represent two cases respectively: 1. the procedure of RBC handover completed
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Table 1
Meanings of Messages in Figure 5
Message Meaning
RBCComd RBC handover command
Req&Train Infor Route requesting information
Call Communication initializing infromation
AnswerCall Communication version information
CommBuilt Communication built infromation
AnswerRBC Route information
HybridMA Hybrid MA on the border
Train position The position of the train
arriveRN Front end of the train arrives at the border
Ann Enter into the region of the RBC2
Infor Takeover information
MA Movement authority
passRN Rear end of the train passed the border
Close Comm Terminate the communication
Table 2
Meanings of Variables in the Program
Variable Meaning
MessageTrain Messages the train received
MessageRBC1 Messages RBC1 received
MessageRBC2 Messages RBC2 received
level Control level of the train
SupervisedByRBC1 The train is supervised by RBC1
SupervisedByRBC2 The train is supervised by RBC2
CommBuilt Communication with RBC2 is builted
FinishHandover The process of RBC handover is completed successfully
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Fig. 5. The Sequence Diagram of RBC Handover
Fig. 6. Simulation Result
successfully; 2. there is no MA in the region of RBC2 and the train control level
changes to level 2 ﬁnally.
5 Veriﬁcation
The veriﬁcation process of the properties speciﬁed in the system requirement spec-
iﬁcation is given in this section. Before verifying the properties, we need to specify
them by PPTL formulas. Then the veriﬁcation can be done automatically by means
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Fig. 7. Modeling Result
of model checking with the MSV toolkit. Here, we only verify three properties.
Property 1: Finally, the procedure of RBC handover completes successfully, or
the control level of the train changes to level 2.
deﬁne p: FinishHandover=1;
deﬁne q: level=2;
ﬁn(p or q)
Property 2: The train receives message “Close Comm” from RBC1 after sending
the message “PassRN” to RBC1.
deﬁne p: MessageRBC1=“PassRN”;
deﬁne q: MessageTrain=“Close Comm”;
p and next(true);q
The veriﬁcation results show that the above 2 properties are satisﬁed but only
the veriﬁcation result of Property 1 is shown in ﬁgure 8.
Now, we verify the 3rd property. The result is shown in ﬁgure 9. As we can see
from the result, property 3 is not satisﬁed. The result means that the train neither
under the control of RBC1 nor RBC2 during a period of time in the handover
process. After an analysis of the requirement speciﬁcation, we ﬁnd that when the
train receives the message “Close Comm” from RBC1, the communication with
RBC1 will be disconnected (time 1). Then the train starts to call RBC2 until the
communication with RBC2 is built (time 2). Between time 1 and time 2 the train
is neither supervised by RBC1 nor RBC2. Hence, the veriﬁcation result of property
3 is consistent with the requirement speciﬁcation.
Property 3: The train is always under the control of RBC1 or RBC2.
deﬁne p: SupervisedByRBC1=1;
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Fig. 8. Veriﬁcation Result of Property 1
Fig. 9. Veriﬁcation Result of Property 3
deﬁne q: SupervisedByRBC2=1;
always(p or q)
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyse the RBC handover protocol for CTCS-3. The UML se-
quence diagram, a semi-formal description of the handover process, is given accord-
ing to the requirement speciﬁcation. Then, we translate the semi-formal description
to an MSVL program. In this way, not only the simulation and modeling processes
can be done with the MSV toolkit but also the more important process, i.e., the
veriﬁcation of the protocol, can be conducted. However, the translation from the
UML sequence diagram to the MSVL program is done manually. Therefore, it is
diﬃcult to ensure consistency between the two formalisms. To improve this, an
automated translation method should be studied. Further, qualitative time in the
model is also needed to take into account in the future.
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